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Tax Aspects of "Property Held Primarily
for Sale"
W wH SUPREME COURT recently considered the question of
whether certain property was "held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness."'  An affirmative answer would have resulted in the gain
being treated as ordinary income, while a negative answer would
have allowed capital gain treatment. By defining "primarily" in
Malat v. Riddell2 as meaning "of first importance" or "principally"
and by remanding the case to the Tax Court for a new factual de-
termination in light of this definition,3 the Supreme Court has
overruled a great deal of existing case law and will perhaps ma-
terially alter the outcome of future cases arising in this area.
The purpose of this Note is to show the probable effect the
Malat definition will have on those sections of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 which use the phrase "held primarily for sale."
The most important sections are those dealing with capital assets'
and property used in the taxpayer's trade or business.' Those sec-
tions dealing with corporate liquidation,' collapsible corporations,7
and tax-free exchanges8 are also slightly affected by the Malat defi-
nition of "primarily" and will be lightly treated.
L CAPITAL ASSETS AND PROPERTY
USED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS
A capital asset is defined by excluding certain types of assets
from the capital asset classification.9 Among those items expressly
excluded are "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business"'" and
"property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is sub-
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (1) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. See Malat v.
Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 570 (1966).
2 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
3Id. at 572.
4 CODE 1221(1).
5 CODE § 1231(b).
6 CODE 337(b) (1) (A).
7 CODE 5341(b) (3) (B).
8 CODE 1031(a).
9 CODE 1221.
10 CODE 5 1221(1).
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ject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or
real property used in his trade or business.""
Notwithstanding the exclusion of depreciable property and real
property used in the taxpayer's business,' the Code permits capital
gain treatment 3 in the sale of such property held for more than
six months where a net gain" is realized. If the sale of such prop-
erty results in a net loss,'5 the taxpayer is allowed a deduction
against ordinary income, unless the property is stock in trade, in-
ventory, or is held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. 6 If both losses and gains occur, it is to the
taxpayer's advantage to establish that the property sold at a loss
was stock in trade, inventory, or held primarily for sale, since such
losses would not be offset against section 1231 gains.
It is clear that the purpose of excluding all property from the
capital asset classification, "held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business," is to treat the "normal source of
business income"'" as ordinary income. The problem arises, how-
ever, in the determination of whether the property sold in a par-
ticular situation, was in fact held primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of business (so that profits would generate ordinary in-
come) or whether, for example, it was held for investment pur-
poses (so that profits would constitute capital gain)." The courts,
being unable to establish a single formula which would readily
answer the question, have been forced to decide each case on its
particular facts. To aid in this factual determination the follow-
ing criteria have been used: (1) the number, frequency, and con-
tinuity of transactions;'" (2) the purpose for which the property
11 CoDE § 1221 (2).
12 CODE § 1221.
13 CODE § 1231(a).
14 Net gain is achieved if total gains exceed total losses.
15 Net loss is achieved if total losses exceed total gains.
16 CODE §§ 1231(b) (1) (A), (B). For example, real estate is either a capital as-
set or is treated as a capital asset where the disposition results in a net gain, unless the
real estate is held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business.
17 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
18 Any other purpose except "primarily for sale" will satisfy the Code requirement.
19 The frequency and continuity of the taxpayer's transactions are probably the most
important factors in determining whether he is engaged in the business of selling the
particular piece of property. The real estate subdivision cases involving systematic and
regular sales in substantial quantity compared to the single isolated sale dearly illustrate
this factor. Compare Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.
1951), with Austin v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 460 (9th Cit. 1959).
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was acquired and held;2" (3) the proximity of the sale to the pur-
chase;2 (4) the activity of the seller in developing the property
and promoting its sale; 2 and (5) other miscellaneous factors indi-
cating that the transaction was in furtherance of the taxpayer's
business2
This case-by-case determination causes difficulty, particularly
when real estate is involved, in determining whether property
originally acquired for investment purposes is converted into prop-
erty held primarily for sale because considerable activities will be
necessary to dispose of the property. 4 For example, a taxpayer
who has held real estate as an investment for twenty years and then
decides that the time is right to sell may find it necessary and more
profitable to subdivide and improve the land before resale. While
section 1237 does permit capital gain treatment on the sale of
subdivided real estate by the investor-taxpayer, 5 if its requirements
are not meticulously followed, the investor-taxpayer may be required
to pay ordinary income rates when it is asserted by the government
that his development activities established a dual purpose for hold-
ing the land: investment and sale, thus, under the old definition,
making the sale one of property held substantially (primarily) for
sale in the ordinary course of business.
2 0 This factor calls for an examination of the taxpayer's intention in acquiring and
holding the property. Austin v. Commissioner, supra note 19; Fahs v. Commissioner,
161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1957); Desilu Prods., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1856 (1965).
21 The simple nile here is that the longer the holding period, the lesser the proba-
bility that the taxpayer is in the business of selling the particular type of property in-
volved. This factor is especially helpful concerning real estate. Wineberg v. Commis-
sioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cit. 1963); James G. Hoover, 32 T.C. 618 (1959).
22 Developing activity is considered to be for the purpose of attracting customers
and consequently implies that the property is being held for sale; this type of activity
is usually limited to real estate. Certainly the greater the sales effort of the taxpayer,
the greater the chance the property will be declared to be held primarily for sale. Maul-
din v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952) (dealing with real estate develop-
ment activity); Fowler v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (dealing
with real estate sales activity).
3See 3B MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.15, at 77 (1958). The
courts have considered the amount of time the taxpayer has spent on other activities; the
ratio between the taxpayer's income from his sale's activity and his income from other
activities; whether or not the taxpayer belongs to any "dealer" associations; and how the
taxpayer holds himself out on his stationery, telephone listing, or tax return.
24For capital gain treatment, see Estate of Barrios v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 517
(5th Cir. 1959); Alabama Mineral Land Co. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cit.
1957); Consolidated Naval Stores Co. v. Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cit. 1955); Chandler
v. United States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cit. 1955). For ordinary income treatment, see
Pennroad Corp. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1958); Palos Verdes Corp. v.
United States, 201 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1952).
25 CODE § 1237 (a):
(a) GENERAL. - Any lot or parcel which is part of a tract of real prop-
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The problem is not confined to real estate. A lease and subse-
quent sale of personal property has resulted in ordinary income
treatment where it was asserted that the property was held for the
dual purpose of rental or sale." Similarly, where an inventor had
a history of both selling and licensing his patents, an individual
sale could result in ordinary income based upon the dual-purpose
doctrine.
The dual-purpose approach gained recognition in Rollingwood
Corp. v. Commissioner7 in which the taxpayer constructed seven
hundred homes with the approval of the National Housing Admin-
istration and the War Production Board on condition that the
houses be rented with a thirty-month purchase option in the tenant.
The taxpayer neither employed a sales force nor used any "For
Sale" signs. It was asserted by the corporation that since the
houses were rented on an average of twenty-one months prior to
their sale they were not held primarily for sale and that the tax-
payer was therefore entitled to capital gain treatment on the pro-
ceeds. The Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's contention, rely-
ing heavily on the frequency and continuity test,28 and concluded
perty in the hands of a taxpayer ... shall not be deemed to be held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business at the time
of sale solely because of the taxpayer having subdivided such tract for purposes
of sale or because of any activity incident to such subdivision or sale, if -
(1) such tract, or any lot or parcel thereof, had not previously been
held by such taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business ... and, in the same taxable year in which the
sale occurs, such taxpayer does not so hold any other real property; and
(2) no substantial improvement that substantially enhances the
value of the lot or parcel sold is made by the .taxpayer on such tract while
held by the taxpayer or is made pursuant to a contract of sale entered
into between the taxpayer and the buyer. For purposes of this paragraph,
an improvement shall be deemed to be made by the taxpayer if such im-
provement was made by -
(A) the taxpayer or members of his family (as defined in
section 267 (c) (4)), by a corporation controlled by the taxpayer,
or by a partnership which included the taxpayer as a partner; or(B) a lessee, but only if the improvement constitutes income
to the taxpayer; or
(C) Federal, State, or local government, or political subdi-
vision thereof, but only if the improvement constitutes an addition
to basis for the taxpayer; and
(3) such lot or parcel, except in the case of real property acquired
by inheritance or devise, is held by the taxpayer for a period of 5 years.
26 S.E.C. Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), af)'d maem.,
241 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957); Greene-Haldeman, 31
T.C. 1286 (1959), affd, 282 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1960).
27 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
28 See note 19 supra.
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that Rolingwood was in the business of selling real estate 9 The
court went on to define "primarily" as meaning "substantial" or
"essential," theorizing that Congress had only intended to alleviate
the tax burden on those whose property increased in value over a
long period of time and did not intend capital gain treatment in
situations where one of the essential purposes for holding the prop-
erty is sale.3
The Rollingwood definition of "primarily" as meaning "essen-
tially" or "substantially" recognized that, although sale often was
not the predominant purpose, it was always a "substantial" one in
certain types of businesses31 Thus, the dual-purpose distinction
was expanded by the courts to such an extent that the Ninth Circuit
stated in Malat v. Riddell: 2
If, however, the property was acquired and held with the purpose
of realizing gain from it in any feasible manner which might pre-
sent itself; if the owner stood ready to adapt his program to such
changes as failing prospects might require and to realize gain
wherever and however he could; then surely the realization of
gain by sale is pursuant to the purpose of the holding. The tax-
payer in such a case could be said throughout the course of his
holding to have had several alternative purposes (all of which
were substantial reasons for his holding within the Rollingwood
definition of "primary"), each of which in turn actually became the
primary purpose as efforts were concentrated in its direction33
This statement seems to suggest that a taxpayer's profits will be
subjected to ordinary income treatment whenever his purpose for
holding the property has changed and he anticipates a profit on a
sale of property after the investment possibilities have become
frustrated. The Tax Court in Joan E. Heller Trust,4 certainly ap-
peared to adopt this suggestion when it ruled that duplex homes
which had been rented for several years after their construction
were "held primarily for sale."3" In reaching its decision the Tax
29 190 F.2d at 266.
30 Ibid.
3 1 Another type of business in which sale is always a "substantial" purpose is the
automobile and truck rental business, where the vehicles are sold after a period of use
in the rental activity. Compare Charlie Hillard, 31 T.C. 961 (1959), with Philber
Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 P.2d 129 (3d Cit. 1956). Certainly a corporation
engaged in the leasing and selling of personal property is another example. See S.E.C.
Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd mem., 241 F.2d 416
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 909 (1957).
32347 F.2d 23 (9th Cit. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
3Id. at 26-27.
34 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1823 (1965).
35 Id. at 1828.
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Court relied upon both the Ninth Circuit's decision in Malat and
its own finding that the owners had contemplated sale from the
outset in the event that the rental efforts were not profitable.
Although the Malat decision involves real estate, it is equally
applicable to personal property. For example, one is struck by
the similarity between Revenue Ruling 62-1416 and the Ninth
Circuit's statement in Malat."' In denying capital gain treatment
to the gain arising from a lessor's sale of television films, the In-
ternal Revenue Service declared:
In view of the fact that television film producers are aware of
the market that exists for sales of television films after initial
leasing periods, it is reasonable to assume that generally, from
the time of their production, a producer's intention is either to
sell, to rent, or to rent and then sell, whichever method proves
most profitable in its business. 8
The Tax Court in Desilu Prods., Inc.3" renounced the principle
of Revenue Ruling 62-141 when it stated:
[I]t would be the height of naivete to assume that any person in
the business of renting property does not realize that at some
point he may have to sell some of it, be it to raise funds to ex-
pand his operation or purchase newer rental property, divest him-
self of outmoded rental property, or to pay his just debts. The
recognition of this possibility is a far cry from harboring an out-
right intent to sell. 40
In Desilu the taxpayer produced television films for rental and
also rented its facilities to others. The Tax Court found-that prior
to 1962 the taxpayer had never sold or offered for sale any of its
films and that the taxpayer was not in the business of selling tele-
vision films. The Tax Court went on to say that, based upon these
facts, it did not have to consider "primarily" since the taxpayer did
not have a "principal," "chief," "essential," or "substantial" purpose
to hold these films for sale.4
Shortly before the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the definition of
"primarily" as meaning "substantial" or "essential" in Malat, the
Eighth Circuit defined "primarily" in Municipal Bond Corp. v.
Commissioner" as meaning "of first importance" or "principal-
36 Rev. Rul. 141, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 182.
8 347 F.2d at 26-27. See text accompanying note 33 supra.38Rev. Rul 141, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 182, 184.
3934 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1856 (1965).
40 Id. at 1862.
41 Id. at 1864.
42341 F.2d 683 (8th Cit. 1965), reversing 41 T.C. 20 (1963).
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ly."43  The facts in that particular case showed that the taxpayer,
in the business of renting real estate, had made substantial sales
during the tax years in question, reporting the profit from these
sales as capital gain. In denying capital gain treatment, the Tax
Court held that "while the sales purpose, in some instances, may
not have been predominant over the investment purpose, it was,
nevertheless, substantial throughout the entire period of review.""
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, defining "primarily"
as meaning "of first importance" or "principally" and stressing that
the plain meaning of unambiguous words in a statute should not
be disregarded.4" The court went on to say that the Tax Court
should determine whether each parcel of land sold was held "pri-
marily for sale in the ordinary course of business" and that this
factual determination should be made by considering the following
criteria: (1) the purpose for which the property was acquired;
(2) the purpose for which the property was held; (3) the motive
at the time of sale; and (4) the method of sale.4"
The conflicting definitions of "primarily" by the courts of ap-
peal4' would seem to be the main reason the Supreme Court re-
viewed the Malat decision.4" However, there are three other strong
reasons for the Court's having granted review. First, the apparent
degree of departure by the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court, and the
Internal Revenue Service from the original purpose of the exclu-
sion - to treat the normal sources of business revenue as ordinary
income - had created great uncertainty and complexity in the
capital gain area. Second, the word "primarily" had a clear and
unambiguous meaning, and had been construed as meaning "of
first importance" or "principally" in cases dealing with other sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code.49 And, third, the Supreme
43 Id. at 688-89.
44 Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 29 (1963).
4 5 Municipal Bond Corp., 341 F.2d 683, 687-89 (8th Cit. 1965).
46 Id. at 689.
4 7 Compare Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cit. 1951)
and American Can Co. v Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
378 U.S. 993 (1964), with United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951)
and Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cit. 1965). See Re-
cordak Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
48 Malat v. Riddell, 382 U.S. 900 (1965).
49 Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 125 F.2d 523 (1st Cit. 1942) (whether primar-
ily engaged in the poultry business so as to be entitled to file bankruptcy as a farmer);
McCaughn v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 63 F.2d 715 (3d Cit. 1933) (whether stor-
age battery was primarily used in automobiles so as to be taxable); Bowles v. Nelson-
Ricks Creamery Co., 66 F. Supp. 885, (D. Idaho 1946) (whether defendant was pri-
mary wholesaler under the Emergency Price Control Act).
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Court itself in Crane v. Commissioner had endorsed the plain
meaning rule of statutory interpretation for revenue acts.
The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion defined "pri-
marily" as meaning "of first importance" or "principally" and re-
manded the case to the district court.5 ' The Court concluded that
"'the words of statutes - including revenue acts - should be in-
terpreted . . . in their ordinary everyday business sense' "52 unless
plainly contrary to legislative intent. The Court then stated that
since the purpose of the "held primarily for sale" exclusion
is to differentiate between the "profits and losses arising from
the everyday operation of a business" on the one hand (Corn
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52) and "the realiza-
tion of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of
time" on the other (Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co., 364 U.S.
130, 134). A literal reading of the section is consistent with
this legislative purpose.53
Certainly the Malat case is a landmark decision and will require
the lower courts and the Internal Revenue Service to change their
position regarding "property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
The use of the term "primarily" now means that the property sold
will receive capital gain treatment unless the purpose "of first im-
portance" for which the property is held is sale in the ordinary
course of business.
The Supreme Court certainly seems to reject the statement
made by the Ninth Circuit that, because each purpose becomes the
primary purpose as efforts are made in its direction,54 a sale of
property acquired and held for the sole purpose of realizing gain,
will result in ordinary income. The Court seems rather to imply
that the critical period for characterization of property goes fur-
ther back than to the time of disposition. Certainly property at
the time of sale is property held primarily for sale, but such a literal
approach would nullify the statutory provisions conferring capital
50331 U.S. 1 (1947). In Yunker v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 130, 133 (6th Cir.
1958), the court, in dealing with the same section, stated: "With respect to the inter-
pretation of the statute, the words and phrases, 'trade or business,' 'ordinary' and 'cus-
tomers' are to be construed in their ordinary and not in an artifically created meaning."
See BLACK, LAW DICTIoNARY (4th ed. 1951) defining "primary" as "first; principal;
chief; leading."
51 Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966).
52 Id. at 571.
53 Id. at 572.
54 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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gain benefits and goes far beyond the legislative intent that "in-
come from everyday business operations" be taxed as ordinary in-
come. Thus the Court realized that the recognition of the possi-
bility of sale at some time in the future is quite different from hav-
ing an intent to sell at the time of purchase. This position is dear-
ly contrary to the position previously taken that a taxpayer is sub-
ject to ordinary income rates whenever he recognizes a profit on
a sale of property after investment possibilities are frustrated.55
The action of the Court in remanding the case to the Tax
Court for fresh fact-findings implies that the determination of
whether property is held primarily for sale is a factual question to
be decided upon consideration of various factors such as the purpose
for which the property was acquired, the purpose for which it was
held, the motive at the time of sale, and the method of sale.
The only case that has been decided under the new definition
of "primarily" is Municipal Bond Corp., the same one that had
been remanded to the Tax Court by the Eighth Circuit for further
proceedings consistent with its definition of "primarily" as mean-
ing "of first importance" or "principally." 7
In Municipal Bond Corp. there were several properties sold,
the Eighth Circuit holding that the Tax Court would have to de-
termine whether each parcel sold was held primarily for sale in
the ordinary course of business.58
One property was sold to a church of which the petitioner (the
principal shareholder of the Municipal Bond Corporation) was a
member. The officials of the church selected the property and re-
quested the petitioner to arrange for its purchase from the corpo-
ration. In declaring that this parcel was not "held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business," the Tax Court
took particular notice of two facts: (1) that the property had
never previously been offered for sale by petitioner; and (2) that
the sale resulted more from the church's desire to purchase than
from the petitioner's desire to sell.59
With respect to the sale of property to the Kansas City Power
and Light Company and to a school district, the Tax Court per-
mitted capital gain treatment for two reasons: (1) the sale was
55 See text accompanying note 34 stpra.
5646 T.C. 219 (1966).
5 7 M unicipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683, 691 (8th Cir. 1965).
5 8 For an enunciation of the criteria to be utilized by the courts, see text accompany-
ing note 46 supra.
59 46 T.C. at 234.
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initiated by the buyers of each parcel, and (2) the sale was made
reluctantly and with the knowledge that both the school board
and the utility company had the power to acquire the property by
condemnation.' °
In permitting capital gain treatment on the sale of a parcel of
land to a filling station that had exercised a pre-existing option to
purchase, the Tax Court placed particular emphasis upon the fact
that when the taxpayer acquired the property it was already sub-
ject to the lease and option to purchase.6
The Tax Court denied capital gain treatment on the sale of
certain parcels of land to the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway. The
court emphasized the fact that at the time the lease was made the
taxpayer had given the railway a continuing offer to purchase the
whole tract 2 at a price in excess of its fair market value. The
fact that the taxpayer also placed a "For Sale" sign on the prop-
erty and advertised the property for development in newspapers
was a further indication that the property was "held primarily for
sale to customers.,
6 3
Thus, it can be concluded from the Municipal Bond Corp. de-
cision that under the Malat definition of "primarily," the courts
will continue to use the same factors in order to determine whether
property is held primarily for sale. According to the Malat for-
mula, one selling property will pay ordinary income rates when-
ever gain is realized from an ordinary business transaction. "4 To
determine whether ordinary tax treatment or capital gain will re-
sult from the sale of property, two questions must be answered.
First, is the taxpayer engaged in the business of selling the par-
ticular piece of property involved? This question entails a factual
determination based on the following factors: (1) the frequency,
continuity, and number of transactions; (2) the purpose for which
the property was acquired and held; (3) the proximity of the sale
to the purchase; (4) the activity of the taxpayer in promoting the
sale; and (5) any other factor indicating the taxpayer was in that
particular business.
6o Id. at 232-33.
61 Id. at 235-36.
6 2 See Joseph A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236 (1958).
63 46 T.C. at 235-36.
64 Desilu Prods., Inc., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1856, 1866 (1965) states: "It is axio-
matic that nobody sells without an intent to sell, but it is the nature of the impetus to
sell and the degree of sales activity that control. To hold property for sale in the or-
dinary course of business requires a reasonably free choice to do so, manifested by sub-
stantial selling activity."
[Vol. 18: 605
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The second question to be answered is whether the particular
property involved was held primarily for sale in the ordinary course
of business. To answer this question one must consider:
(1) whether its sale is "of first importance" to the taxpayer, and
(2) whether the actual sale took place in the ordinary course of
the taxpayer's trade or business.
An affirmative answer to both inquiries will subject any gain to
ordinary income treatment.
1.. OTHER SECTIONS OF THE CODE
DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY MALAT
The phrase "property held by the [taxpayer] for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of [his] ... trade or business,""6
appears in several other sections of the Code, the most important
of which are: (1) section 337 involving tax-free liquidations;
(2) section 341 involving collapsible corporations; and (3) sec-
tion 1031 involving tax-free exchanges of property. The Supreme
Court's definition of "primarily" as meaning "of first importance"
or "principally" will definitely have some effect on the above-men-
tioned sections.
A. Tax-free Liquidations
Assuming that a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquida-
tion and sells all of its assets within the twelve-month period pro-
vided by statute, there arises the question of what types of transac-
tions in the course of liquidation will receive tax-free treatment.
Section 337 (a) states that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to
such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property."
However, stock in trade, inventory, property held for sale in the
ordinary course of business, and certain installment obligations
when not sold in bulk are excluded from the term "property.""6
The purpose of subsection 337 (b) was very aptly summarized
by the Senate Finance Committee" -when it stated: "It is intended
that, during the 12-month period, sales in the ordinary course of
business shall result in ordinary gain to the corporation as if the
corporation were not in the process of liquidating."6 8 This certain-
0 5 This phrase appears in all the sections to be discussed except § 1031. Section
1031 excludes property "held primarily for sale."
6  OD13 5 337(b).
67 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
6 8 Id. at 259.
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ly indicates an intent on the part of the Congress to prevent corpo-
rations from using section 337 to avoid ordinary income treatment
on profits arising from normal business operations.
The Malat definition of "primarily" puts in issue the authority
of Hollywood Baseball Ass'n69 in which the sale of certain baseball
players to the Pittsburgh Pirates by the liquidating corporation
was held not to be within the non-recognition provisions of section
337.70 The rules of organized baseball required the taxpayer to
hold its player contracts for sale to major league clubs under cer-
tain procedures, and the taxpayer did have a working agreement
with the Pittsburgh organization which provided a ready outlet for
its player contracts. The liquidating corporation argued that the
baseball players were not held "primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of business" but on the contrary were developed at a great
expense to the ball club primarily for the purpose of playing base-
ball.71
The Tax Court held that it was unnecessary to determine
whether the major purpose for which the player contracts were
held was for playing baseball or for sale, since "primarily" did not
necessarily mean "principal" or "chief" but rather "essential" or
"substantial."7'  The court, deciding that the sale of such contracts
was "essential" to the baseball club's business, and produced "sub-
stantial" profits, held the sale to be within the section 337 exclu-
73sion.
The reliance by the court upon "primarily" meaning "essen-
tial" or "substantial" suggests that the result might be different
under Malat. Certainly the court's approach will have to be
changed, because the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Malat.74
The new definition of "primarily" as meaning "of first im-
portance" or "principally" will continue to disallow corporations
to escape ordinary income treatment on profits derived from sales
in the ordinary course of their business. At the same time, the de-
cision will reinforce the fact that section 337 was enacted to per-
69p-H 1964 TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 5 64173
(1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded, 383 U.S. 824
(1966).
701d. at 64195.
7' Id. at 64192-93.
72 Id. at 64193.
73 Id. at 64194.
74 383 U.S. 824 (1966).
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mit a corporation to escape' taxation of the proceeds derived from
the sale of corporate assets when the sale is followed by the distribu-
tion of the proceeds to the shareholders and to the extent that the
corporation would have avoided taxation if it had distributed its
assets in kind.75
B. Collapsible Corporations
A collapsible corporation for purposes of this discussion will be
defined as one formed or used in order to purchase property which
is to be held for less than three years and which is held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business"h or is de-
preciable or is real estate used in the business and not held pri-
marily for sale in the ordinary course of business.77
There are three aspects of section 341 which should be re-
called in determining whether a corporation falls within the "col-
lapsible" category. First, the corporation must be "formed or
availed of, principally . . . for the purchase of property with a
view to!' liquidation before the corporation has realized a "sub-
stantial part" '79 of the intended profit. Second, the property pur-
chased is not a section 341 asset if it has been held for more than
three years.8 0- Finally, a corporation will be presumed collapsible
if at the time of liquidation the fair market value of section 341
assets is (1) fifty percent or more of the fair market value of its
total assets,81 and (2) 120 percent or more of the adjusted basis of
such assets.8
2
The case of Braunstein v. Commissioner,8m recently decided by
the Supreme Court, paradoxically indicates that while the individ-
ual shareholder of a corporation will realize ordinary income from
the distribution to him of the corporation's real estate held for
rental for less than three years, an individual owning the same
75S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong, 2d Sess. 258 (1954); HR. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See also Commissioner v. Kukenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir.
1962).
76 For an excellent discussion of collapsible corporations in general, see Cavitch,
Collapsible Corporations, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 278 (1962).
77 See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
78 CODE § 341(b) (1).
79 CODE § 341(b) (1) (A).
80 CODE § 341 (b) (3).
8 1 CODE § 3 4 1(c) (1) (A).
82 CODE § 341(c) (1) (B).
83 374 U.S. 65 (1963).
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real estate for the same purpose would receive capital gain treat-
ment under section 1231 (b). The paradox results from the fact
that section 341 assets include not only "property held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of . . . business" but
also real property used in the trade or business and other property,
used in the trade or business, subject to depreciation under section
167. This type of property would normally include corporate-
owned television and motion picture films, copyrights, and land
rich in natural resources, since all could appreciate in value in a
short period without any production activity on the part of the
taxpayer.
Thus it can be concluded that the Malat decision will have lit-
tle effect on section 341, for the new definition will simply trans-
fer the questioned property from the "held primarily for sale in
the ordinary course of business" category into the real or depreci-
able property used in the taxpayer's trade or business category,
both of which are 341 assets.8 4
C. Tax-free Exchanges
Section 1031 provides for the non-recognition of gains or
losses upon the exchange, solely for property of a like kind, of
property held for productive use in business or for investment.
Expressly excluded, however, are (1) inventory, (2) property
held primarily for sale, and (3) stocks, bonds, notes, choses in
action, trust certificates, and other securities of indebtedness."5
The purpose of section 1031 is merely to postpone the recog-
nition of a gain or loss; it is in no way intended to produce a for-
giveness of the tax. This tax postponement objective is accom-
plished through appropriate use of the basis provisions."6 The
basis of the property transferred after a tax-free exchange remains
the same in the hands of its transferee and thus permits proper
recognition of gain or loss when an actual disposition occurs. It
is clear, then, that the aim of section 1031 is to recognize gains
or losses to their full extent once, but only once.
The critical dichotomy existing under section 1031 lies not in
the difference between property held for investment purposes and
property held for productive use in the taxpayer's trade or business,
since these purposes are fully interchangeable, but rather between
84 COD1 § 341(b) (3).
8 5 CoDE 5 1031 (a).
86 CODE § 1011-23.
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property held primarily for sale and all other property held for
investment or productive use in trade or business."
The phrase "stock in trade or other property held primarily for
sale" is much broader in scope than is the section 1221 definition
of capital assets, which refers more narrowly to
stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business.s8
This broader language of section 1031 (a) excludes all trader
items from tax-free treatment, which term includes certain non-
dealer assets.8 9 For example, in the classic case of Harr v. Mac-
Laughlin,"9 a bank acquiring an apartment building through a
mortgage foreclosure, later exchanging that property for three va-
cant lots, was permitted to take an ordinary loss, as opposed to the
tax-free treatment accorded property held for productive use or
investment. The court reasoned that the bank's policy of reselling
foreclosure property rather than holding it for productive use or
investment caused the property to fall within the "held primarily
for sale" exception, thus excluding it from the capital asset cate-
gory and thereby subjecting the loss on the exchange to deductible
ordinary income treatment rather than to non-deductible tax-free
treatment. This case illustrates the broader scope of section 1031 (a)
because, had the bank sold the apartment rather than exchanging
it, the bank would have received capital gain treatment upon the
gain or loss arising from the transaction. The sale by the bank,
being incidental to its normal business operation, would have
caused the property to be classified as a capital asset. 1
Thus, the absence of the words "to customers in the ordinary
87 CODE § 1031 (a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031 (a) -1 (1956). Also excluded are stocks,
bonds, notes, choses in action, trust certificates, and other securities of indebtedness.
CODE 9 1031(a).
88 CODE § 1221(1).
8 0 The "trader" classification is the result of a historical belief that the sale of secu-
rities on an exchange is not a sale "to customers." This is so because a trader who is en-
gaged in the business of selling securities offers a fungible commodity to an anonymous
group of bidders, so that the sale of a particular security by a trader to any particular
buyer is impersonalized to the point of coincidence, since the buyer could have just as
easily purchased an identical security from any other seller.
90 15 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1936).
91 Kanawah Valley Bank, 4 T.C. 252 (1944), acq., 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 102. Cf.
Thompson Lumber Co., 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941).
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course of his trade or business!"' in the statute excludes property
from a tax-free exchange even if the taxpayer is not in the busi-
ness of selling such property. The case of Ethel Black 3 dearly
illustrates this point. The taxpayer exchanged desert property for
a residence subsequently held for sale. In denying the taxpayer a
tax-free exchange, the Tax Court stated that gain is recognized
where the property is held primarily for sale, even though it is not
held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. 4
The Malat definition of "primarily" means that the holding
purpose requirements of section 1031 may be completely satisfied
even with respect to property acquired and held with the ultimate
intent of disposition after "the realization of appreciation in value
accrued over a substantial period of time."95  Thus it can be con-
cluded that the holding purpose requirements will fail only if the
sale of the property is "of first importance."
III. CONCLUSION
By defining "primarily" to mean "of first importance" or "prin-
cipally," the Supreme Court implied that it will allow capital gain
treatment of the gains derived from the disposition of property, real
or personal, whenever the realization of gains accrues over a sub-
stantial period of time but that ordinary income rates will be applied
to profits and losses arising from ordinary business transactions.
Similarly, this new definition will continue to disallow businesses an
escape from ordinary income rates in such everyday business trans-
actions, regardless of whether it is sought through liquidation, crea-
tion of collapsible corporations, or attempted tax-free exchanges.
JOHN D. STEELE, JR.
92 The words "to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" appear
in all the other sections discussed.
93 35 T.C. 90 (1960).
94 Id. at 96.
95 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
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